I n the realm of environmental controversy in the United States, apocalyptic rhetoric is consistently associated with environmentalist voices. Examples of such labeling abound: an editorial in the Investor's Business Daily discussing clean air concludes, "Meanwhile, green groups froth with apocalyptic rhetoric."
2 Describing a case of ecotage, the editor of the Richmond Times Dispatch claims, "It is mildly tempting to blame mainstream environmentalists, with their sometimes apocalyptic rhetoric, for fostering an atmosphere upon which the lunatic fringe feeds." 3 And in a piece provocatively titled "No Reason to Fear the Environmental Bogeyman," Ben Eisen contends, "For decades, the more radical elements of the modern environmental movement have employed terrifying, apocalyptic rhetoric in an effort to scare citizens and policymakers into enacting an agenda that can go beyond common sense environmental policies." 4 But the easy association of environmentalism with apocalyptic rhetoric is inaccurate and politically misleading. When mass media identify environmentalism as apocalyptic, they mark environmentalism as radical, outside the mainstream, and unreasonable, which clears a space for industry voices to be perceived as the rational center, the commonsense approach to environmental issues. 5 This association also deflects attention from the apocalyptic rhetoric that comes from industry. In his history of environmental politics, Samuel Hays problematizes the association of environmental discourse with the apocalypse, claiming that historically "environmentalists were the purveyors of optimism about the possibilities of human achievement while administrative and technical leaders were the constant bearers of bad news. In the media the roles were reversed: Environmentalists warned of impending catastrophe, while the technical leadership exuded optimism." 6 Rhetorical scholars who continue to identify apocalyptic rhetoric with environmentalism reinforce this distorted perception of the rhetoric of environmental controversies-a move that unnecessarily limits our understanding of apocalyptic rhetoric. For example, although M. Jimmie Killingsworth and Jacqueline Palmer acknowledge that "the enemies of environmentalism have regularly devised apocalyptic narratives of their own," 7 they also identify apocalyptic narrative as "a standard feature of environmentalist polemic" 8 and focus primarily on environmentalist voices, while giving brief attention to only two examples of apocalyptic rhetoric from opponents of environmentalism: Monsanto's rejoinder to environmentalist uses of apocalyptic discourse has deflected attention away from the structure and function of apocalyptic rhetoric used by countermovements to environmentalism. This essay seeks to remedy that oversight. We propose the concept of industrial apocalyptic as a signifıcant rhetorical form in environmental controversy, using texts in support of the U.S. coal industry as our examples. We defıne industrial apocalyptic as narratives that constitute the imminent demise of a particular industry or a broader economic system for the purpose of influencing public opinion and public policy. This form of apocalyptic is consistent with the secular apocalyptic that Kurt Ritter and David Henry identify in the conservative rhetoric of Ronald Reagan, a rhetoric that, in James Arnt Aune's view, consistently seeks to manage the ideological tensions between free-market capitalism and patriotism. 11 We fınd that the industrial apocalyptic rhetoric used on behalf of the coal industry relies on a burlesque frame to disrupt the categories of establishment and outsider and to thwart environmental regulation. 12 Ultimately, the industrial apocalyptic co-opts environmentalist appeals for radical change in the service of blocking such change and naturalizes neoliberal ideology as the commonsense discourse of the center. The essay proceeds by fırst reviewing scholarship on apocalyptic rhetoric and the burlesque frame to establish our theoretical framework. Then, it justifıes our focus on the rhetoric supporting the coal industry before analyzing the apocalyptic and burlesque dimensions of that rhetoric. The latter portion of the essay draws out several implications that advance our understanding of those concepts as well as the role that industrial apocalyptic rhetoric plays in articulating neoliberal hegemony.
THEORIZING APOCALYPTIC RHETORIC
Apocalyptic rhetoric is a recurring feature of American public discourse that has drawn the attention of many rhetorical scholars. 13 Foust and
Murphy defıne apocalyptic rhetoric as having "a linear temporality empha-sizing a catastrophic end-point that is more or less outside the purview of human agency," with stronger versions exhibiting a "persistent placement of 'natural' events as catastrophic, inevitable, and outside of 'human' control." 14 Apocalyptic rhetoric functions as a predictive discourse that aids the audience in understanding the past, present, and future 15 and as an ideological discourse in which the narrator promotes a "change in consciousness or political agenda" that is as extreme as the predicted catastrophe. 16 Scholars have noted that apocalyptic rhetoric in particular has enjoyed a resurgence in popularity in contemporary times, in and beyond environmental discourse. 17 Apocalyptic appeals are an increasingly pervasive cultural phenomenon, perhaps brought on by "millennial apocalypticism," or the widespread sense that the turn of the century would be marked by apocalyptic change. 18 We see this as additional evidence that attributing apocalyptic appeals solely to environmentalists is itself a rhetorical move, one that deflects attention from industrial apocalyptic rhetoric. Environmentalist versions of apocalyptic rhetoric have garnered mostly unfavorable attention precisely because they challenge one of the primary touchstones of U.S. culture: progress. 19 The impacts of economic and industrial progress became a concern in the 1950s as people began to see the environmental downsides of advances that had been touted as life improving. 20 In the following decade, Rachel Carson's 1962 book Silent Spring and Paul R. Ehrlich's 1968 The Population Bomb were widely read, popular books that narrated a dark future if people did not control the use of pesticides and human reproduction, with Ehrlich causing considerable controversy with his dire claims that it was already too late to prevent a substantial increase in the world death rate. 21 Climate change has reawakened overt public questioning of progress, although Killingsworth and Palmer maintain that the public response to climate change has produced a weaker version of apocalyptic rhetoric-not the imminent collapse of human society with no means of intervention but one that allows behavioral changes to help mitigate the effects of global warming. 22 Scholars with an interest in environmentalist apocalyptic also have attempted to theorize the effects of apocalyptic rhetoric on environmental action. They query, Does apocalyptic rhetoric effectively engage an audience and create a sense of environmental identity or responsibility? 23 Or does it backfıre, generating fear and alienating the audience into a state of denial or withdrawal? 24 In their analysis of the apocalyptic "flood myth" in the global warming feature fılm The Day After Tomorrow, Michael Salvador and Todd Norton argue that the apocalyptic appeal can do either or both, depending on how it is framed: "Contemporary apocalyptic and jeremiad discourses of humans-in-nature manifest a palpable dialectic that sustains human agency as both subject to the power of nature and effectual at intervening in nature." 25 Yet, these authors argue, that dialectic can be dissolved, emphasizing agency or not, depending on the framing of the appeal. The framing of apocalyptic discourse has been taken up most thoroughly by Foust and Murphy. Using Stephen O'Leary's classifıcation of apocalyptic discourse into Burkean frames, 26 Foust and Murphy fınd in their examination of U.S. press coverage of global warming both "a tragic apocalypse, which constitutes global warming as a matter of cosmic Fate; and a comic apocalypse, which suggests that mistaken humans have a capacity to influence (within limits) the end of the global warming narrative." 27 They contend that the tragic approach forces readers to choose sides between the global warming naysayers and the apocalyptical environmentalists, concluding that it is "untenable as a rhetorical strategy for encouraging the public to become active participants in climate change mitigation." 28 They offer the comic apocalyptic frame as a potential solution to the dilemma of human agency. "The comic frame promotes humanity as mistaken, rather than evil. . . . To the extent that humanity is mistaken, it has agency for making different choices which may lead to different outcomes. . . . Humanity is less likely to be resigned to its fate, and, as such, may be inspired to take steps to change." 29 In the following sections, we expand this discussion of apocalyptic rhetoric in two signifıcant ways. First, we extend the application of Burkean frames to apocalyptic rhetoric by defıning a burlesque variant of that discourse. Second, we analyze an industrial version of apocalyptic rhetoric, describing its central features and explaining how it functions dialectically to counter and weaken environmental claims.
THE BURLESQUE FRAME
Rhetorical analyses of the burlesque frame proceed from Kenneth Burke's designation of burlesque as a frame of rejection in which an advocate ridicules opponents mercilessly and "deliberately suppresses any consider-ation of the 'mitigating circumstances' that would put his subject in a better light." 30 33 and it "invites not sympathy but scoffıng dismissal" of those opponents. 34 A. Cheree Carlson concurs that in the burlesque frame there is no possibility for identifıcation with the object of ridicule, since doing so would only tarnish the virtue of the audience. 35 The burlesque frame has been identifıed in diverse forms of environmental rhetoric, including public controversies over natural resource management, political cartoons, and television shows. 36 However, no studies have explicitly linked burlesque to apocalyptic rhetoric; Moore only implicitly connects burlesque to apocalyptic when he explains that the rights-based, all-or-nothing burlesque rhetoric of water wars in the western United States has resulted in "a doomsday discourse of rights lost by a particular group."
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A similar pattern can be observed in the rhetoric of the coal industry, revealing how the extremes of the burlesque frame can lend themselves to the elaboration of an apocalyptic narrative. We use the scholarship on burlesque to identify a form of apocalyptic rhetoric that differs from the comic and tragic apocalyptic frames described by Foust and Murphy and to explain the functions and implications of that rhetoric as it is employed by the coal industry to naturalize neoliberal ideology and thwart environmental regulation. First, we observe that the burlesque frame retains capacity for human agency in contrast to the tragic frame; however, that action is one of rejection. Chris Smith and Ben Voth compare the comic and burlesque frames in this way: "Action in the comic frame provides a platform to confront and correct problems while simultaneously laughing at faults instead of persecuting individuals for wrongs committed. . . . When acceptance of the 'comic fool' does not occur, the emphasis shifts to rejection and the dramaturgical frame becomes burlesque." 38 Likewise, Edward Appel places burlesque on a continuum halfway between comic-reformist rhetoric at one pole and tragedy at the other pole: "Instead of the crimes and evils of tragedy or the mere mistakes and impediments of comedy, the scene in burlesque is fraught with gross violations of revered, traditional principles of life and action." 39 In turn, burlesque typically promotes a limited form of scapegoating of one's adversaries, advocating exclusion from the public sphere rather than complete tragic destruction. 40 Burlesque thus offers a form of agency in response to apocalyptic conditions, but one that looks quite different from the more charitable comic corrective championed by Foust and Murphy. Moreover, burlesque allows us to further elaborate the particular character of the coal industry's anti-environmental rhetoric and its resonances with contemporary conservatism and a broader neoliberal ideology. It is notable that Appel explains burlesque in relation to two titans of conservatism in the United States, William F. Buckley and Rush Limbaugh. He claims that the polemical caricature and scapegoating of burlesque rhetoric leads to a redemptive vision rooted in narrow, sectarian, "cynical selfinterest." 41 Indeed, Appel's study of Limbaugh concludes by explaining how the talk show host's distinctive rhetoric, a "burlesque tinged with tragedy," was a fıtting rhetorical articulation within the context and purposes of the conservative movement's ascendancy in the mid-1990s-specifıcally, "free-market economics, low taxes, and repeal of all repressive federal laws that stood in the way of personal enterprise and aggrandizement." 42 These are precisely the issues that have animated the neoliberal ideology undergirding U.S. conservatism since the mid-1970s. In Robert J. Antonio and Robert J. Brulle's account, neoliberalism is grounded in a free-market ideology that calls for "deregulation, privatization, welfare cuts, and reduced taxation to revive high corporate profıts and economic growth." 43 Moreover, they claim that neoliberalism gained political traction with Reagan's appointment of James Watt and that "anti-environmentalism has been, from the start, a keystone of neoliberal antiregulatory politics." 44 Thus, it is important to observe how the burlesque frame helps to sustain that ideology and its particular form of anti-environmentalism.
COAL: AN INDUSTRY UNDER PRESSURE
We focus on the coal industry for a number of reasons. First, for decades coal has dominated electricity production in the United States, providing half of the electricity consumed. In the spring of 2012, that total share dropped to below 40 percent for the fırst time and may continue falling.
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The industry is under pressure from several directions-environmental regulation due to climate change, negative public opinion over the practice of mountaintop removal mining, the growing concern over coal-fıred power plants, and, perhaps most notably, market competition from natural gas. The coal industry unquestionably sees itself, or at least has represented itself, as facing catastrophe. 46 Second, the rhetorical choices the industry makes in response to these conditions are a signifıcant contributor to the discourse of economic crisis that has been circulating since 2008. These choices are telling in terms of the industry's ideology, its understanding of its audience, and how it views its relationship to local communities and the national economy. Third, we cannot ignore the fınancial resources of energy companies and how that enhances the circulation of their rhetoric. For example, the New York Times calculated that two months before the 2012 presidential election, "estimated spending on television ads promoting coal and more oil and gas drilling or criticizing clean energy [had] exceeded $153 million" for "138 ads on energy issues broadcast . . . by the presidential campaigns, political parties, energy companies, trade associations and third-party spenders." 47 The coal mining industry made $13.4 million in federal campaign contributions during the 2012 election cycle and since 2010 has averaged $18 million in spending on corporate lobbying. 48 Finally, and most signifıcant for this project, aside from a few studies of major oil companies like Exxon 49 and BP, 50 little research in rhetorical studies has examined public discourse surrounding conventional energy extraction, making it an important area of study for the discipline.
To understand the rhetorical dynamics of apocalyptic narrative and the burlesque frame, we gathered coal advertisements and other industrysupporting texts, including Greenpeace's archive of coal ads from 1921 to 2012, 51 and videos and print ads from two industry-supported campaigns, the Federation for American Coal, Energy and Security (FACES) of Coal and America's Power. 52 To examine the widespread use of the burlesque apocalyptic frame, we also collected popular press and op-ed pieces produced by allied organizations and think tanks that support the coal industry.
We then compared and contrasted the environmental apocalyptic appeals found by Foust and Murphy to the industrial apocalyptic appeals found in the coal texts. This approach allowed us to focus on defıning and delineating the structure and function of industrial apocalyptic rhetoric.
KILLING COAL
Even a cursory glance at the advertisements and promotional materials of the coal industry makes it clear that the industry views the United States in general, and the coal mining regions in particular, as imperiled. The sonorous voice narrating one FACES television advertisement intones: "Coal provides nearly 50% of our nation's electricity and keeps our electricity affordable. But now coal is threatened by EPA regulations that would shut off access to American coal, put tens of thousands of Americans out of work, and could cause electric rates to triple. Keep the lights on." 53 The fundamental premise of this argument is that regulations not only threaten the coal industry but also put America on the brink of energy and economic ruin: the industrial apocalypse. An ad from the FACES of Coal website provides a more detailed version of this apocalyptic scenario. The header, constructed to look like a green road sign one might see crossing a state border, reads, "Welcome to West Virginia!" In caution-yellow font written diagonally across the welcome are the words "A federal no-job zone by the order of the Environmental Protection Agency." The text below reads, "America's jobless rate is stuck at 10%, yet unelected bureaucrats in our own federal government are making things worse! The U.S. EPA's latest attack on coal mining threatens to make economic dead zones of vast areas of West Virginia, Kentucky, Virginia, Pennsylvania, Tennessee and Ohio. It may wipe out thousands of jobs in Appalachia-potentially yours." Billboards supplementing the campaign show the six states highlighted in red with a large banner of the same color that reads, "Obama's NO JOB ZONE." The yard signs, also in red and black, proclaim, "STOP the WAR on COAL. FIRE OBAMA."
We found a consistent combination of apocalyptic narrative and the burlesque frame in the texts we analyzed. This rhetoric establishes that:
• There is an imminent disaster (economic dead zone, American failure, control of the United States by foreign governments, destruction of the economy, loss of liberty, coming tyranny).
• There is an entity to blame for the disaster (federal government, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), unelected bureaucrats, Obama, environmental movement).
• The entity is illogical, inept, hypocritical, devious, and malicious.
• The entity is beyond redemption and therefore must be opposed or removed.
• The audience is in no way responsible for the impending disaster.
These elements receive an even more hyperbolic treatment in an ad from the organization Kansans for Affordable Energy. 54 Under prominent headshots of Vladimir Putin, Hugo Chavez, and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, the red-lettered title asks, "Why are These Men Smiling?" The answer reads, "Because the recent decision by the Sebelius administration [Kathleen Sebelius, then-Governor of Kansas] means that Kansas will import more natural gas from countries like Russia, Venezuela, and Iran." The organization then claims that this action will cause higher electric bills, lost economic activity, and reduced energy security, thus allowing "hostile foreign countries to control the energy policy of Kansas and America." The solution is to call the Kansas House of Representatives, letting them know that the "state's electricity must come from clean, affordable, reliable coal-America's energy future." The ad was published in response to Kansas Department of Health and Environment Secretary Rod Bremby denying air-quality permits necessary for an existing coal fıre power plant to expand. In his decision, Bremby cited "the ever-increasing environmental risks associated with the emitted carbon dioxide." 55 Sebelius upheld the decision. 56 The advertisement sets up an apocalyptic vision of a nation whose economy and energy are controlled by its political enemies. The cause of this dire situation is not widespread reliance on fossil fuels or high levels of individual consumption but the decision made by Governor Sebelius's administration. Her capacity to make decisions is presented as flawed to the point that her actions solely benefıt America's enemies and put the nation at risk. The organization does not encourage the viewer to contact Sebelius but other (seemingly more reasonable) state legislators-Sebelius is symbolically cast out. The ad clearly illustrates the burlesque frame as it presents a simplifıed and polarized argument crafted for easy dismissal. Sebelius is stripped of her title and position. She and her administration are characterized solely in pejorative terms. The text implies rejection in that no attempt is made to understand her reasoning or negotiate with her administration. She is defective beyond repair.
Industry campaigns are not the only examples of this rhetorical form. We found conservative pundits, talk radio hosts, and authors of popular non-fıction texts also supporting industry using apocalyptic rhetoric in a burlesque frame. Recent books by conservative syndicated radio hosts Mark Levin 57 These most recent examples of industrial apocalypse link traditional anti-environmental arguments about the economic disasters that will result from environmental policies and regulations to contemporary iterations of threats to individual liberty and impending tyranny that will result from environmental regulations. In doing so, they represent a rearticulation of the secular apocalyptic that Ritter and Henry associate with Ronald Reagan, and they illustrate the way in which contemporary versions of the industrial apocalyptic are attempting to manage ideological tensions. 58 Consider, for example, Levin's description of the impact of a "cap and trade" policy to curb the impacts of global warming:
The coming invasion of the home and the workplace, the restriction of individual liberty, independence, and mobility, and the deconstruction of America's economic system and impoverishing of the citizenry are justifıed in the name of a long and growing roster of preposterous assertions [about the impact of global warming].
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This argumentative strategy couples climate change denial rhetoric with neoliberal concerns about "big government," the destruction of the freemarket system, and the loss of individual freedom. All are combined into an apocalyptic vision of the future. Environmental advocates, especially climate change advocates, are labeled and demonized as "alarmists," "statists," or "enviro-statists." They are not simply mistaken but malicious and callous. A common feature of these industrial apocalyptics is the retelling of the historical narrative and implications of Rachel Carson's Silent Spring, a canonical environmental text that raised awareness in the United States of the threat of pesticides for human and environmental health. In Levin's retelling, Carson, "the EPA and its environmental group masters conspired in a deliberate and systematic distortion of science, leading to genocide-like numbers of deaths of human beings throughout the underdeveloped world." 60 DDT is praised as a "wonder chemical" that protected American soldiers from malaria and is now maliciously withheld from people in the "undeveloped world." Environmentalists are assigned tyrannical power and associated with genocide. The burlesque apocalyptic framing of environmentalists could not be clearer-if they are responsible for genocide, then they are beyond redemption. This attempt to revive the controversy associated with Carson's Silent Spring represents a return to the apocalyptic roots of anti-environmental rhetoric in Monsanto's "The Desolate Year." The resonances between the latter text and contemporary industrial apocalyptic rhetoric are numerous. As in "The Desolate Year," contemporary opponents of environmentalism generate apocalyptic visions of economic collapse, as environmentalist policies create "dead zones" and resource constraints that set prices spiraling out of control. Likewise, there are allusions to "the looming threat of some insidious other lurking beyond U.S. borders" who threatens sovereignty. 61 Finally, "The Desolate Year" narrative ends by posing a question that articulates apocalyptic anxieties in nationalist terms similar to those in Levin's and Sussman's books: "What, at the end of such a year, would be the fate of the United States of America?" 62 However, the contemporary version of industrial apocalyptic deviates from "The Desolate Year" in at least one important respect: its explicit identifıcation and strident characterization of environmentalists and regulators as blameworthy entities. In "The Desolate Year," environmental and public health regulation still have a role; the Food and Drug Administration and Department of Agriculture are simply prevented from doing their job effectively without the needed tool of pesticides.
63 But more recent instances of industrial apocalyptic are animated by a full-throated attack on the environmental-regulatory complex, pushing this rhetoric more fully into a burlesque frame. As such, this antiregulatory attack is also an attack on the environmental progress of the twentieth century; that progress and the broader environmental agenda are recast as a threat to the free market and the values that support it. Consequently, we interpret the resonances between coal industry ads and conservative punditry as emblematic of a broader neoliberal ideology.
WANTING AMERICA TO FAIL
An exemplary instance of industrial apocalyptic that reinforces neoliberalism is the fıve-minute video "If I Wanted America to Fail" that was posted on both the FACES and Friends of Coal (a related industry front group) websites during the spring of 2012. The video was originally produced by Free Market America, a public relations campaign supported by Americans for Limited Government, a nonprofıt group that supports and organizes state ballot initiatives that are strongly neoliberal and antiregulatory. 64 The video features a charismatic actor fılmed against a black background, eloquently moving through a series of talking points, speaking directly to the camera. Suspenseful and cinematic instrumental music plays in the background. The actor's face is lit by a high key light, and the talking points are strung together with a series of jump cuts or cutaways to iconographic American images such as the Washington Monument, the American flag, and medium shots of working-and middle-class Americans. But the video also features images that represent industrialized American society: extraction machinery, sleek airports, and city streets. The talking points are just that-a string of statements that obliquely reference actual events but are not logically or explicitly connected to one another. Rather than offer an internally coherent argument, they signal the viewer to particular ideological platforms and hot-button controversies (such as the spotted owl conflict in the American Northwest) and link them together only through the repeated refrain of "If I wanted America to fail." The video opens with this depiction:
If I wanted America to fail . . . I would start with energy. I'd cut off America's supply of cheap, abundant energy. I couldn't take it by force. So, I'd make Americans feel guilty for using the energy that heats their homes, fuels their cars, runs their businesses, and powers their economy. I'd make cheap energy expensive, so that expensive energy would seem cheap. I would empower unelected bureaucrats to all-but-outlaw America's most abundant sources of energy. And after banning its use in America, I'd make it illegal for American companies to ship it overseas.
As the speaker vilifıes the "unelected bureaucrats," we see images of a pencil scribbling across a page, and then the camera pans over stacks of books, perhaps meant to symbolize the intellectual, elitist Left. Although the entire video seems to be ideologically aligned with the rhetoric of the coal industry, it is this point about regulation that makes the video so appealing to the coal lobby, whose primary political and economic concern is the regulation of carbon emissions. The "America Fail" video amplifıes these concerns, suggesting that such regulation is part of an unpatriotic scheme to take down the country. The metonymic twinning of "coal" and "America" is the coal industry's most frequent and powerful rhetorical move, and one that fıts the burlesque frame perfectly: any attempt by bureaucrats to regulate coal must be seen as a threat to America.
The repeated refrain of "If I wanted America to fail" facilitates a rhetorical strategy of amplifıcation. Much like the enumeration of harms caused by pests in "The Desolate Year," the video compiles a series of ways to make America "fail" that include teaching children about the global warming conspiracy, demonizing prosperity, overregulating small business, ridiculing energy executives, saving spotted owls, and "fıxing" free markets with schemes such as carbon cap and trade. Echoing concerns about overregulation, and again reifying the concern over government offıcials, the speaker contends, "I would empower unaccountable bureaucracies seated in a distant capital to bully Americans out of their dreams and their property rights. I'd send federal agents to raid guitar factories for using the wrong kind of wood; I'd force homeowners to tear down the homes they built on their own land." From here the speaker makes explicit who is responsible for putting America at risk. "If I wanted America to fail, I would transform the environmental agenda from a document of conservation to an economic suicide pact. I would concede entire industries to our economic rivals by imposing regulations that cost trillions." The themes of economic catastrophe or apocalypse associated with environmental policy and regulation are thus reiterated.
The speaker then elaborates on the maliciousness and depravity of those who want America to fail, stating, "I would celebrate those who preach environmental austerity in public, while indulging in lavish lifestyles in private." This statement illustrates supposed environmentalist hypocrisy and is visually accompanied by the clicking of champagne glasses and then by headlines that reference Al Gore and pop singer Madonna. The speaker drives home the burlesque frame by stating: "I would prey on the goodness and decency of ordinary Americans. I would only need to convince them, that all of this, is for the greater good." In doing so, the video positions the audience, "ordinary Americans," as the victims of hypocritical environmentalists who "prey" upon them. The speaker concludes with the words, "If I wanted America to fail, I suppose I wouldn't change a thing." 65 Across all these examples, the means of avoiding the apocalypse are both explicit and implicit. The explicit appeals are for the audience to call their representatives, vote, join organizations such as FACES or America's Power, and/or support the coal industry. The other, often implicit, solution is to remove the categorically flawed entity that has caused or exacerbated the oncoming apocalypse. Unlike the comic frame in which the entity is shown to have a redeemable flaw, in the burlesque frame the person or organization is beyond recovery and thus must be removed. Public calls to stop Obama's reelection, for his impeachment, for the dismantling of the EPA, or for the dismissal of various elected offıcials, while not necessarily stated in each advertisement, are the logical, if extreme, response to the burlesque version of industrial apocalyptic.
STRATEGIC AND IDEOLOGICAL IMPLICATIONS OF INDUSTRIAL APOCALYPTIC RHETORIC
Given the ongoing rhetorical struggle over the meaning of environmental and economic crises, our analysis of industrial apocalyptic in the rhetoric of the coal industry provides an example of "how crises get rearticulated and transformed as they circulate among various contexts." 66 In this instance, industrial apocalyptic helps the coal industry respond to a variety of pressures and recast environmental regulation as the cause of economic crisis that poses a fundamental threat to individual liberty. In this concluding section, we use our analysis to address two critical questions about industrial apocalyptic rhetoric and its influence on broader trends in public discourse. First, why is there such a consistent, strong backlash to environmental apocalyptic rhetoric and such a muted response to the industrial apocalyptic rejoinder? Even though opposing sides warn of approaching catastrophe, the industrial rejoinder seems to generate far less public resistance. Second, how does industrial apocalyptic rhetoric contribute to the hegemony of neoliberalism, which sustains existing patterns of resource extraction, production, and consumption? Both questions are crucial for interpreting and criticizing the public discourse that constitutes controversies over energy resources and environmental protection.
ENVIRONMENTAL VERSUS INDUSTRIAL APOCALYPTIC
In comparing environmental apocalyptic rhetoric to its industrial counterpart, environmental apocalyptic rhetoric asks more of its audience. It constructs a problem that is not isolated or contained; it affects everyone and calls into question each aspect of a person's life. As a result, the apocalyptic rhetoric used by environmentalists often calls for a "fully radical transformation of society" 67 and a fundamental ideological shift. 68 It takes control of the problem out of human hands (tragic frame) or lessens the human agency to stop the apocalypse (comic frame). 69 Environmental apocalyptic rhetoric implies diffıcult fıxes-systemic and expensive changes to infrastructures and cultures-and its speakers get chided when they provide solutions that do not seem to match the magnitude of the problem, such as changing a light bulb. In contrast, industrial apocalyptic rhetoric asks less of the audience: it merely encourages its audience to support the countermovement, join an organization, or vote. It constructs a problem that is signifıcant but contained; it is regional, organizational, individual, or industry specifıc. Like other instances of secular apocalyptic rhetoric, industrial apocalyptic "treats historical events as contingent on human action;" 70 it puts both the problem and solution squarely in human hands. Moreover, it provides quick fıxes, offering small changes via a comic frame or calling for removal of the offending entity through the burlesque. The shift in human agency may be one of the reasons that the response to the environmental apocalyptic rhetoric varies so dramatically from the industrial. Environmental rhetoric often frames the apocalypse as unintended: individual decisions about the chemicals people put on their lawns, the modes of transportation they use, and the number of children they will have contribute to an impending disaster that no one person has caused, yet all are responsible for. The burlesque version of industrial apocalyptic flips this argument through the use of a scapegoat, thus absolving the audience of any responsibility for imminent catastrophe. This scapegoat is powerful, often to the point of tyranny. Whereas environmentalists place individual decision making at the root of the apocalypse, the industrial rejoinder claims that the true catastrophe is overregulation of individual decisions, which poses a fundamental threat to the free market. The focus on an all-controlling tyrant absolves the audience of any personal guilt for the problem, thereby removing the impetus to lash out at the rhetor. Instead, they are called upon to funnel their anger toward a scapegoat to again regain control of their lives. Following the logic of the burlesque frame, the scapegoat must then be rejected.
This explanation of why industrial apocalyptic rhetoric fınds easier public acceptance must also take into consideration how the burlesque frame promotes broader ideological goals. Moore explains the scapegoating dynamics of burlesque by arguing that "This act of rejection also implies some corresponding acceptance of something else, thus the tendency toward extreme partisanship." 71 But what, exactly, does apocalyptic rhetoric ask its audience to accept? The answer is often vague. For environmentalists, ambiguity about goals leaves them vulnerable to charges that they are idealistic, lacking a clear vision of the future and a practical blueprint for getting there. 72 In contrast, for industry, burlesque apocalyptic functions as a negative method of promoting acceptance of the status quo. By casting blame on a caricatured environmentalist position and then offering rejection of that position as the preferred solution, the coal industry can deflect sustained critical attention to the environmental consequences of extracting and burning coal. Instead of a "radical transformation of society," industrial apocalyptic calls for the buttressing of traditional free-market principles.
INDUSTRIAL APOCALYPTIC, BURLESQUE, AND NEOLIBERALISM
Three of the rhetorical elements of burlesque described previously illustrate how industrial apocalyptic amplifıes and normalizes neoliberal ideals. First, burlesque depicts the scene of action as "an environment of gross and categorical violation of traditional principles." 73 Second, it "drives external actions of opponents to absurd extremes." 74 Third, it "invites not sympathy but scoffıng dismissal." 75 By exploring the way that the coal industry's rhetoric integrates these moves with the apocalyptic narrative form, we can see how neoliberal ideals are amplifıed and normalized by industrial apocalyptic. First, neoliberal ideology is articulated through burlesque by framing the scene as a gross and categorical violation of traditional free-market principles. Each of the texts we analyze emphasizes ideographs such as ϽlibertyϾ, Ͻfree marketsϾ, and Ͻprivate propertyϾ. The identifıcation of traditional principles grounds the industrial apocalyptic narratives in neoliberal ideology. Further, identifying and focusing on the counterpoints, or threats to these traditional principles-"environmental regulation," "unelected bureaucrats," "environmentalists"-reframes environmental concerns and other pressures on industry as evidence of a threat to cherished economic and cultural principles that undergird neoliberalism. In addition, the Kansans for Affordable Energy ad emphasizes the ideograph of ϽsecurityϾ as it raises the specter of "hostile foreign countries" trying to control U.S. energy policy, articulating a link between neoliberal economic ideology and neoconservative national security rhetoric. Market regulation not only infringes on individual liberty, it also puts national sovereignty at risk.
Second, as the coal industry uses the burlesque to caricature opponents and their actions by pushing them to absurd extremes, it deflects attention from neoliberal practices and allows those practices to escape critical scrutiny. For example, the ad that focuses on a "no job zone" shifts emphasis away from corporate profıts to unemployed individuals and attributes unemployment to the "war on coal" launched by Obama and "unelected bureaucrats." This buttresses the neoliberal ideology by implicitly defıning individuals as reliant on industry and by providing the industry with a scapegoat that shifts responsibility for unemployment away from production-side measures utilized to increased corporate effıciency (such as mountaintop removal mining and increased mechanization) and market competition from other energy sources such as natural gas.
Third, the scoffıng dismissal of burlesque is ultimately a reactionary rhetoric designed to thwart progressive challenges to the neoliberal status quo. Consider the last line of the "If I Wanted America to Fail" video: "If I wanted America to fail, I suppose I wouldn't change a thing." Here we see the "appearance" of a call for radical change, a sort of call to arms to resist and rebel against a caricatured foe-environmentalists and government agencies. With this move the coal industry attempts to hold back a challenge to their hegemony by reversing the roles traditionally played in environmental controversies 76 -environmentalists are cast as all-powerful tyrants of the establishment, the coal industry as a rebellious, persecuted underdog. The ideographs in play are familiar neoliberal fare (liberty, freedom, private property) and are designed to tap into the spirit of American rebellion and revolution. In short, the burlesque apocalyptic becomes an expansive rhet-oric (from "no job zone" to American failure) that goes on the offensive to resist change.
Further, the industrial apocalyptic as deployed by the coal industry illustrates the complexity of contemporary rhetorics of reaction. Albert O. Hirschman, in his classic study, identifıes three argumentative forms associated with the rhetoric of reaction-the perversity thesis, the futility thesis, and the jeopardy thesis. 77 The industrial apocalyptic presents a sophisticated variant of the jeopardy thesis, in which proposed progressive reforms are constituted as a threat to previously hard-won gains associated with liberty and economic security. For the jeopardy thesis to be effective, Hirschman argues, "there must exist the living memory of the highly prized earlier reform." 78 And yet, living memories are rhetorically produced. By building narratives that articulate gross violations of traditional principles, provide scapegoats for declining economic conditions, and offer rebellion against environmental tyrants, the industrial apocalyptic does the rhetorical work needed to produce the living memory that enables the rhetorical form. The apocalyptic narrative form brings together all these elements of reaction in a burlesque form as it shapes an audience's understanding of past, present, and future. 79 This seamless narrative depicts an ideal past of full employment in which historic conflicts between labor and industry are ignored; a present in which scapegoats are responsible for declining production and increasing unemployment; and a future in which imagined economic catastrophe and tyranny will prove the claims of the coal industry once and for all. 80 Indeed, the coal industry is able to use cost-cutting strategies, such as laying off workers, to "prove" that this future is in fact a reality. 81 However, the backward-looking call for restoration of traditional free-market principles is a temporal shift that enables this rhetoric to avoid the apocalyptic label. Thus, by taking advantage of the apocalyptic narrative form the coal industry is able to amplify its burlesque frame and hide its apocalyptic claims in plain sight. The apocalyptic rhetoric and the burlesque framing deployed by the coal industry also enable the industrial position to be seen as the commonsense discourse of the center. As Star Muir explains, the very assertion that environmentalists engage in apocalyptic rhetoric and the absence of a countervailing label for similar industry rhetoric does the rhetorical work of positioning environmentalism as extreme and its proposed solutions as hopelessly utopian. 82 Moreover, as Hays suggests, labeling environmental-ists as doomsayers elides the optimism that comes with the belief that environmental problems can be identifıed and solved, and it deflects attention from the inherent pessimism of industrial apocalyptic discourse, which asserts that any attempt at addressing environmental problems will lead to certain economic decline and job loss. 83 That pessimism is reconstituted as commonsensical and realistic. Our analysis extends Hays's insight by developing the ideological implications of these rhetorical strategies; in particular, that industrial apocalyptic in a burlesque frame provides a rhetorical form that is well suited to normalizing neoliberalism as common sense. It is effective for two main reasons. First, liberalism, and by extension neoliberalism, are ideologies that are often articulated through a burlesque frame. As Burke notes, "The method of burlesque (polemic, caricature) is partial not only in the sense of partisan, but also in the sense of incompleteness." 84 Liberalism, according to Burke, offers rights but denies obligations. It defends liberty and private property in absolutist terms and ignores corresponding and complementary duties to society and the common good, which, in turn, would "require us to stress the ambivalence of rights and obligations." 85 For Burke, "the very basis of classic liberal apologetics, the over-emphasis upon freedom, was but a sober way of carrying out the burlesque genius." 86 Neoliberalism, like liberalism, utilizes this same kind of overemphasis on freedom to craft an extreme and polemic ideology that identifıes individual liberty with private property and market rationality. The use of the burlesque frame masks the apocalyptic character of the industrial narrative. The frame helps manage the tension between the apocalyptic narrative's implied call for radical rebellion and the neoliberal goal of restoring traditional free-market principles According to Killingsworth and Palmer, apocalyptic narrative "is an expansive and offensive rhetorical strategy." 87 It goes on the offensive by implying "the need for radical change," by marking "oneself as an outsider," risking "alienation," and urging "others into the open air of rebellion." 88 By deploying apocalyptic narratives, the coal industry is able to go on the offensive, position itself as a radical outsider, and call for rebellion against a caricatured opponent. But in combination with the burlesque frame, industrial apocalyptic turns away from calls for radical social or ideological change and thus avoids risking alienation. In this sense, industrial apocalyptic is a new twist on the strategy of aggressive mimicry that Jennifer Peeples observed in the rhetoric of the Wise Use Movement, 89 in which pro-industry organizations employed the anti-establishment identity and discourse of environmental groups to force environmentalists to use limited resources to defend themselves against the characterization that they were government insiders focused solely on special interests. In this case, the coal industry co-opts the apocalyptic language and appeals of environmentalists but then uses a burlesque frame to position those who produce and benefıt from an entrenched neoliberal ideology as radical outsiders being attacked by powerful and dominant foes. Just as Tea Party rhetors position themselves as radical outsiders, even while they defend the most basic and traditional liberal principles (individualism, liberty, private property), so too is the coal industry able to position itself as a radical agent of social change, even while it works to prevent social change. The appearance of burlesque in industrial apocalyptic, its degree of intensity, and its potential shading into tragedy all may serve as indexes of neoliberal ideology and point toward sites where neoliberalism's footing is not yet secure. 90 In other words, industrial apocalyptic marks key moments of the ideological suturing of neoliberalism's contradictions. The burlesque frame is just one rhetorical tactic for pursuing this work. The exaggerated, absurd extremes of industry rhetoric analyzed in this essay mark an aggressive mode of neoliberal rhetoric, whereas the rhetoric of coal front groups that makes support for coal inherent to regional cultural values or national identity reveals its more positive, celebratory mode. Ultimately, industrial apocalyptic rhetoric attempts to clear the rhetorical fıeld of competing voices and naturalize neoliberal ideology as the commonsense way of approaching environmental and economic crises. 
